

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI - re. Overseas Security

As the "experts" reports begin
to emerge now, this thinkpiece
by is timely.

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Director

4 June 1987

NOTE FOR: DDCI

SUBJECT: Overseas Security Issues


Bob:

I understand there will be an NSPG on overseas security issues (focused in the first instance on Moscow but likely to broaden) probably in July. The NSC (Kelly) will have concluded its damage assessment, the PFIAB will have presented its ideas, the Schlesinger report will be complete, and there may be additional ideas from Capitol Hill on the table.

My guess is that the NSPG will confront some very bold proposals for change from the PFIAB and perhaps the Hill. State will be aghast - CIA and Defense will likely look at their feet and mumble that they believe State should be in charge.

Attached is a different kind of response...uncoordinated with anyone, though Clair George, Bill Donnelly, [redacted] [redacted] Bob Lamb and others have read it and commented.

What would you think about opening up some internal discussions about options to the status quo...(with the understanding that State would probably hear about it and find it unhelpful)?



Attachment

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New Initiatives in Overseas Security

1. The Moscow Marine and New Embassy Building cases, following the Walker, Howard, Chin, Pelton, and GUNMAN cases, is generating pressure for changes in the organization and conduct of the U.S. Government's overseas security activities. The Laird Commission, the PFIAB, and former Defense Secretary Schlesinger are all focused on overseas security and counterintelligence issues. There is discussion about whether responsibility for certain or all aspects of the United States' overseas security posture should be shifted from State to NSA, CIA, the FBI, or possibly an entirely new organization. There may well be pressure for "solutions" in the Washington area as well.

2. Perhaps the most fundamental issue with respect to the security of our overseas missions is: Who really is responsible? In theory, the Department of State is. Ambassadors are the President's representatives abroad. They are responsible for the overall conduct and coordination of all aspects of mission performance, including security. Other departments and agencies have traditionally operated under State's umbrella. However, this fragmented approach has come under intense criticism...as has the Department. Many believe there have been major deficiencies in State's security capabilities. Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the Department's security performance is that security is only a second-order or even a tertiary concern within the Department and the Foreign Service. In addition, many believe the Department lacks the necessary competence to manage the sophisticated technological effort which must necessarily form a large part of a comprehensive overseas security program in this day and age.

3. Moving responsibility for security out of the Department to NSA or CIA or the Bureau would answer both of these criticisms. Each of these organizations accepts security as an integral part of its operations, and each has had experience in successfully managing the related technologies. In addition, each is involved in 'offensive' operations and can therefore better appreciate how important a 'defense' can be.

4. But placing CIA, NSA, or the FBI in a position of overall responsibility for overseas security would create new problems. It is easy to see how the FBI, CIA, or NSA might be given full responsibility for technical security overseas. It is less clear how one of these organizations might effectively be made responsible for all aspects of physical security. It is even less clear how any of them might be given overall responsibility for personnel security in our overseas missions. (Our embassies abroad are populated by representatives of many different

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federal agencies. Some have suggested that the FBI be given a personnel security role over all employees in selected overseas missions. But CIA, NSA, and State all would consider a continuing FBI role with respect to their people to be unacceptable, given that each regards personnel security as an integral part of its own command responsibilities. An equally important criticism of this idea is that it's adoption would further fragment responsibility overseas...precisely what we do not need.)

5. Our experience in the last several years should tell us, if we needed to be reminded, that the Soviet attack on the security of our missions and people overseas is both relentless and comprehensive. It might not be possible to prove in a court of law that the Soviet's have benefited from our fragmented response to their comprehensive attack, but one important goal of any change to our current way of doing business must be to facilitate a more comprehensive and integrated U.S. Government response. "Comprehensive and integrated" suggests that the United States' defensive procedures and programs overseas should continuously benefit from the experience of our offensive units, and that the best thinking of our personnel, physical, and technical security people should consistently be brought to bear on the security situation in a given country to ensure a continuing, close assessment of any possible weaknesses.

6. It follows that over the long haul, the USG's goal should be to put organizational arrangements and procedures in place which concentrate and focus responsibility for the physical, technical, and personnel security of all aspects of America's overseas embassy presence, and which provide for continuing, close coordination between the different organizations involved. In furtherance of this basic approach, it would be useful to consider an Executive Order which would establish or affirm the following principles:

- First, special procedures, standards, and mechanisms will be specified for technical, physical and personnel security programs in criteria countries by the NSC.
- Second, CIA will assume full responsibility for technical security in such countries, with support and cooperation from State, NSA, and, occasionally, the FBI. The whole Government's technical security resources are very scarce--it makes no sense to sustain or encourage a fragmented approach. CIA should also be responsible for those aspects of physical security within embassies which have a direct bearing on, or where there is an intimate relationship with, technical security issues.
- Third, the Department of State should be fully responsible for physical security of U.S. embassies, consulates, and related facilities--except where physical security issues merge with the technical security responsibilities outlined above.

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Effectively then, responsibility for physical security abroad would be divided: State would be responsible for those aspects which relate to such things as possible terrorist attack and protection of embassy buildings from demonstrations; CIA would be responsible for ingress-egress issues, locks, alarms, surveillance systems and the like.

- Fourth, each Department or Agency represented overseas would continue to be responsible for personnel security issues concerning its own employees. Under NSC direction, however, posts would be classified as to the espionage-related security threat they faced, and a set of NSC-mandated personnel security standards would be imposed on all employees serving in criteria countries. The highest personal security standards (to include mandatory use of the polygraph under specified circumstances) would be imposed in these high threat posts, the standards adopted would apply uniformly to all agencies represented in a mission, and compliance would be assured by a certification process of some kind. Certification would be backed up by periodic audit or inspection by the parent organizations and supplemented by the knowledge of all embassy employees that they were all individually held to the same standard. The DCM might chair a Country-Team Subcommittee explicitly charged to monitor personnel security/counterintelligence issues relating to employees. To further support this effort, State's Regional Security Officers would have independent authority to communicate directly from embassies abroad to State Department Security here in Washington.

7. Other steps will be required to make this three-pronged approach work. Not the least important of these will be a sea-change in security consciousness among those outside the Intelligence Community. In this connection, CIA, NSA, and the FBI probably should be tasked to develop and support an intensive security briefing program to ensure that no one is assigned overseas without detailed exposure to the Government's best understanding of the possible risks involved. And new interagency mechanisms might need to be developed to ensure the proper integration of the new physical, technical, and personnel security effort described.

8. Such an approach seems reasonable and workable. It answers the most difficult questions we face, it properly preserves department and agency line authority over employees, it would provide a more appropriate integration of our physical and technical security capabilities than exists today, and it would better fix responsibility, ensure the best use of scarce personnel resources, and help achieve a more integrated approach to the security situation in individual embassies. It could also be the basis for a comprehensive NSC initiative which might help prevent well-intentioned but misguided solutions from being imposed on the Executive Branch by Congress.